Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
Autores
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Juan Carlos Bércena-Ruiz
Universidad del País Vasco
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Quan Dong
South China Normal University
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María Bergoña Garzón
Universidad del País Vasco
Resumo
This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is indifferent between a tax and a standard.
Palavras-chave:
Environmental tax, emission standard, mixed oligopoly, privatization
Números especiais
Prestes a ser publicado
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